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Sovereign Wealth Funds in a World of Economic Transformations

by NNW Bureau
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Good afternoon.  It is a pleasure to be here in Athens.  My thanks to the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds Secretariat and the Government of Greece for hosting us, and to Prime Minister Mitsotakis, from whom we will hear shortly.

Sovereign wealth funds are being asked to do more than ever.  And this is happening at the same time as the economic environment in which they operate is becoming more complex.

As our latest World Economic Outlook shows, the global economy has once again proved more resilient than expected.  It has absorbed a pandemic, energy shocks, and repeated disruptions to trade and supply chains.  But that resilience is uneven.  Economies at the heart of the technology investment boom have outperformed, while energy importers outside the technology supply chain have suffered. 

At the same time, several profound transformations are simultaneously unfolding across the global economy, each of which will evolve in unpredictable ways.  Interest rates are normalizing after a prolonged period of unusually low rates and compressed term premia.  Trade and capital flows are reorienting as both nation-states and private actors reassess existing patterns of economic integration.  And our economic and social systems are being reshaped by technological advances.  The sheer complexity of each of these forces and the interactions between them were recurring themes at our Annual Meetings in Bangkok last month.

For sovereign wealth funds, two questions follow.  How do these transformations change the behavior of asset prices and the investment strategy?  And what do they imply for the governance of the institutions that manage public wealth?

Let me first describe the three transformations, then turn to investment strategy, and finally to governance.

Three economic transformations

Starting with interest rate normalization.

The post-pandemic rise in interest rates marks a decisive break with the ultra-low-rate environment of the 2010s.  That earlier environment reflected not only low inflation and policy rates, but also large-scale central-bank asset purchases that compressed term premia and lowered governments’ financing costs.  The marginal buyer of government debt has moved from relatively price-insensitive parties—central banks included—to relatively price-sensitive parties.  Hedge funds, for example, are today playing a much larger role in government debt markets, in part because of post-financial-crisis regulatory changes that have reduced banks’ role as intermediaries and end-investors.

With policy rates and term premia now higher, debt-service costs are rising.  In advanced economies, that is putting further pressure on government budgets that are already struggling to make room for public investment in defense, infrastructure, education, energy security, and technology due to the crowding-out effect of increasing social spending that is largely linked to aging.

Second, patterns of global economic integration are being rewired.  For decades, firms and governments sometimes neglected to differentiate between short-term efficiency and long-term robustness.  Supply-chain disruptions, national-security concerns, and unbalanced patterns of growth have made the costs of this miscalculation clear.

The implication of this shift is not necessarily deglobalization per se.  It is more likely to alter the geography and organization of integration, with decisions increasingly shaped by resilience and security, not just cost efficiency.

Third is the rapid advancement of software tools, often broadly referred to as “artificial intelligence.”  However, I have long said that this term is misleading, as it suggests the substitution of human intelligence, rather than its amplification.  This new technological wave could be a major step change for the global economy, diffusing across sectors and changing how capital and labor combine to produce value.  

Yet two basic questions remain.  The first is how large the benefits will be: whether we will see modest productivity gains, a transformative breakthrough, or something in between.  The second is who will reap those benefits.  Will the gains accrue mainly to model developers, semiconductor firms, and countries at the center of the supply chain?  Or will they flow more broadly to adopters: governments, firms, and households that put the technology to use?

What the transformations mean for investment strategy

For investors, the central implication for their existing portfolios is not simply that there is “more risk.”  It is that assets may behave differently from the way they did in the past.

How much these shifts matter depends on the purpose of the individual fund.  As IMF research shows, a stabilization fund can help smooth government spending by reducing the fiscal volatility associated with commodity-price fluctuations.  Because resources may be needed when shocks hit, liquidity and safety should be prioritized.  By contrast, a savings fund with a horizon of decades can ride out volatility and capture higher yields over time.

Let me start with the rise in benchmark interest rates.  Higher yields offer higher potential returns, and there may also be opportunities to move along the spectrum of public credit, including toward high-quality agency or government-sponsored-enterprise paper.

The supply of duration is also shifting as the curve steepens.  Governments are borrowing shorter.  And highly rated technology giants have significantly increased their long-term borrowing to fund new investments.  Long-dated corporate debt is not new, but its concentration in a handful of firms tied to one technology cycle is.  The question for long-term investors is whether that paper can really substitute for sovereign duration.

At the same time, heavier sovereign debt issuance and rising debt-service costs may also alter the risk profile of traditionally safe assets.  Funds therefore may need to distinguish more carefully among safety, liquidity, and duration risk across government bonds.

Country allocation and foreign-exchange risk may also become more complex.  If monetary policies diverge in a higher-rate and more shock-prone world, currency volatility may rise.  And if the perceived safe-asset status of some currencies or sovereign issuers weakens, country and currency exposures that once provided diversification may become more correlated precisely when protection is needed.

A second challenge is the rewiring of trade and capital flows as patterns of economic integration shift.

A portfolio can look diversified across countries, sectors, and asset classes while remaining exposed to the same underlying chokepoints.  A European manufacturer, an Asian technology company, and a U.S. cloud provider may all depend on the same advanced chips, shipping routes, energy inputs, or digital infrastructure.  A disruption at one node could simultaneously affect several holdings that are treated as orthogonal in existing risk models.

This calls for a more lateral view of diversification.  The relevant question is not only where an asset is listed or how it is classified, but what common systems it depends on: suppliers, payment rails, computing infrastructure, energy networks, legal jurisdictions, and geopolitical relationships.  Some funds are already moving in this direction, relying less on index-based portfolios and weighing geopolitical and supply-chain risk more explicitly in how they allocate across countries and sectors.

Geopolitical competition and conflict can also shape funds’ investment decisions through spending needs at home.  The current energy shock, for example, may lead some energy exporters to finance major infrastructure to bypass vulnerable chokepoints.  If that money comes from their sovereign wealth funds, or from revenues that would otherwise go to them, less would be invested abroad.  Over time, that could affect funding conditions in certain markets.

The ongoing technological revolution adds yet another layer.  Investment is increasingly concentrated in a small group of companies and the physical and digital infrastructure on which they rely.  Funds must assess not only whether expected returns on technology investment will be realized, but also whether their portfolios are becoming overly dependent on the same narrow set of firms and assumptions about the future of computing.

The growing importance of technology in global portfolios also makes it harder to predict how markets would respond to a disappointment.  Some equities disproportionately benefiting from the current capex cycle may suffer, as might firms that are investing heavily if their returns cannot outrun depreciation expenses that will bite over time.  On the other hand, those same firms might paradoxically benefit as they pare back investment due to disappointing returns, and their cash flow improves. 

Additionally, the effect of a technology disappointment on currency markets, and in particular on the U.S. dollar, would not be obvious.  Historically, the dollar has strengthened both when U.S. assets outperformed and in times of stress, when investors seek safety—a pattern sometimes described as the “dollar smile.”  But that pattern has not always held, and even if we are in a dollar-smile regime, it can be hard to know precisely where on the smile you are and the convexity you are facing on either side. 

A reassessment of technological promise that reduced expected U.S. productivity and the attractiveness of U.S. technology equities could put pressure on the level of the dollar, but if the correction triggered a global flight to safety, the dollar might strengthen.  A hedge based on the historical relationship between technology equities and the dollar might therefore protect the portfolio in one scenario and amplify losses in another.

The practical response is not to discard models, but to use them with humility.  Funds may need to test portfolios against a broader range of narratives, map common dependencies that standard classifications miss, and review strategies more frequently so they can pivot when the underlying regime changes.

They also need to preserve enough liquidity to meet demands during periods of market stress, or when geopolitical disruptions make cross-border assets harder to sell or their proceeds more difficult to repatriate.  That matters all the more as funds move further into private markets, direct investments, and co-investments, often in new computing infrastructure levered to the technology cycle.

No one has a complete playbook for navigating these three transformations.  But prudent risk management means addressing these questions proactively rather than discovering the answers under pressure.

What about sovereign wealth fund governance?

The increased complexity of the international economic environment also raises hard questions about governance.  Well-governed funds can preserve national wealth, strengthen resilience, and act as stabilizers in times of stress.  But poorly governed funds can become sources of instability.  That is why the Santiago Principles, which this Forum stewards, remain as relevant as ever.

At the IMF, we help members set up new funds, update the laws that govern them, and integrate them into fiscal frameworks.  Increasingly, that means looking at funds as part of the wider public balance sheet, which is the first of three priorities I want to highlight.

As IMF research has long emphasized, funds work best within sound fiscal, monetary, and financial frameworks, and should be assessed alongside public debt, state-owned enterprises, and future obligations.  The goal is to strengthen net public wealth, not the fund’s gross value.

Consider borrowed savings.  A government running deficits may keep contributing to a fund while borrowing elsewhere at a higher cost—leaving the country richer in sovereign wealth fund assets, but possibly poorer overall.  Such contributions make sense only if risk-adjusted expected returns cover the financing cost.  And amid the three economic transformations, traditional risk adjustments may need to be more heavily discounted. 

The second priority is to make sure domestic and strategic roles add public value.  More governments are adding strategic or development objectives to their funds’ mandates, or setting up separate funds for that purpose, and all three transformations are implicated.  Fiscal strain makes citizens ask why public savings are invested abroad.  The reassessment of integration puts economic security on the agenda.  And the new technological paradigm increases the value governments place on having a domestic stake in new technologies.

These are decisions for national authorities, but they raise the bar for governance.  Broader mandates need to be matched by clear objectives and accountability, as recent IMF work has stressed.  Backing national champions can come at the expense of market returns or can hurt domestic competition.  Financing projects directly can turn a fund into a channel for quasi-fiscal spending—a second budget process that escapes legislative scrutiny and obscures the true fiscal position.  And heavier domestic investment can undermine the insurance that funds are intended to provide by tying future returns to the domestic economy.

Investing at home need not mean giving up on returns; many funds pursue security, developmental, and financial goals simultaneously.  But because the fund sits closer to government and to the firms in which it invests, it needs stronger safeguards: an explicit commercial mandate, clear return benchmarks, and robust conflict-of-interest rules.  Non-commercial objectives should be explicit and costed—and are sometimes better housed in a separate window or institution.

That brings me to the third priority: building legal guardrails before the pressure arrives.  The law should set out the fund’s purpose, permitted uses, who may authorize withdrawals, and how the mandate can be changed.  Escape clauses for genuine shocks should be narrowly tailored and specify the path back to the rule.  Withdrawals should pass through the budget, and any change in purpose should be an explicit decision subject to political accountability, rather than the sum of one-off requests.  All this needs to be backed by timely public reporting and by oversight from the legislature or another appropriate body.

My colleague Yan Liu, the IMF’s General Counsel, has led pioneering work in this area and will say more on tomorrow’s panel.

The IMF’s recommendations on investment strategy and governance serve a common purpose: enabling sovereign wealth funds to adapt without losing sight of why they exist.

That is also why legitimacy matters.  As budgets tighten and governments ask funds to do more at home, public scrutiny rises.  When the cost of living climbs, citizens are less tolerant of losses and more likely to question why public savings are invested abroad.

Funds ultimately depend on public support, not just legal authority.  Governments and funds therefore need to explain clearly what a fund is for, how it contributes to national objectives, and what any non-commercial objectives cost.  The greater the pressure on a fund, the more important it becomes for citizens to understand its purpose.

When legitimate objectives point in different directions, judgment becomes paramount.  When the ground moves, rules tell you where the boundaries are.  Judgment tells you where to stand.

Here in Athens, that judgment has a name: phronesis, practical wisdom.  It is what will allow sovereign wealth funds to meet this moment without losing the public trust on which their legitimacy depends.

Thank you very much.

read more: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/11/11/sp111126-international-forum-sovereign-wealth-funds-dan-katz

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