This is the eighth in this year’s job market series.
Rich economies increasingly condition market access on the environmental impact of production abroad. When a steel producer in Gujarat, India is faced with such standards in an export market, it can invest in less polluting machinery, reduce sales to that destination, or redirect shipments to markets where no such requirements apply.
While each of these responses comes with very different implications for global emissions, trade, and welfare, evidence on which paths exporters take remains scarce. In my job market paper, I study how foreign suppliers adjust their investment, production, and trade decisions in response to such regulations, and quantify the aggregate effects on emissions and welfare.
Why regulate production abroad?
Climate change is a global issue, while the policies designed to address it are largely national in nature. Richer economies have moved faster in this respect, regulating the environmental footprint of their own production and decoupling emissions from economic growth. However, much of the developing world, with older technology and more relaxed regulatory regimes, has not managed to do so.
This induces a familiar problem at the intersection of environmental policy and trade, whereby firms facing pollution costs will simply move their production and sourcing to less regulated jurisdictions. This phenomenon, known as carbon leakage, can undermine the effectiveness of unilateral climate policy, while placing domestic producers at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis foreign suppliers. In response, policymakers in rich economies resort to cross-border regulations, which extend their environmental requirements to production abroad.
The EU’s carbon border charge and how I study it
In my study, I focus on the most prominent such regulation, the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), introduced in 2023. The policy seeks to align the carbon costs faced by EU producers under the EU Emissions Trading System with those faced by foreign suppliers selling into the EU. By imposing a charge on the carbon embedded in emissions-intensive imports, CBAM prevents carbon leakage and protects the competitiveness of EU producers, creating incentives for foreign suppliers to adopt cleaner production technologies.
I study this in the context of India, a major developing-country exporter of covered goods. To do so, I combine a proprietary dataset of firm-to-firm customs records with administrative data on financials and a database of 60,000 capital investment projects of Indian firms. Given that these records do not identify whether an investment involves cleaner production, I systematically classify projects as green or polluting, distinguishing upgrades to core production processes from investments in renewable energy and carbon capture. I then compare firms that exported covered goods to the EU prior to the policy with similar unexposed firms, before and after its announcement.
Exposed firms upgrade their technology and adjust trade behavior
Affected firms respond by investing in clean technologies, increasing their stock of green capital projects by 18% relative to comparable ones. The bulk of this investment is in the form of upgrades to core production processes rather than installation of renewable generation capacity. Investment is also concentrated among firms starting from dirtier asset bases, suggesting that the policy induces technological catch-up among more polluting firms.
This, in turn, enables exposed firms to substitute their on-site fossil fuel generation with purchased grid electricity, reducing the fossil fuel share of their energy bill by 18 p.p. while increasing their grid electricity purchases by 23 p.p.
Firms also shift trade away from the EU and towards other destinations. However, this diversion accounts for only about one fifth of the contraction in EU-bound exports. Meanwhile, export prices at the Indian border remain unchanged over the period of interest.
Importantly, firms with less to lose in the EU are more likely to divert their sales, whereas firms most exposed to the EU market are the ones most likely to invest in order to maintain access. These results suggest that firms weigh the cost of upgrading against the importance of the EU market to their business. The investment required for cleaner production is considerable and is more easily justified when EU sales are sufficiently important.
The policy has the potential to reduce global emissions
The reduced-form estimates capture how Indian suppliers respond to the border charge. However, the implications for global emissions and welfare will be contingent on what India’s competitors do, how production shifts around markets, and whether cleaner production will spill over into other destinations.
To quantify the aggregate effects, I build a model of trade and technology adoption across four markets: the EU, India, India’s main competitors, and the rest of the world. Firms decide whether to serve the EU market and whether to adopt a costly cleaner technology. Adoption affects production throughout the firm, allowing it to produce more cleanly for both the EU and other markets.
The model suggests that CBAM results in a 1.9% reduction in global emissions across the covered industries, at an implied cost of around $11 per tonne of emissions avoided, lower than recent estimates on the social cost of carbon. The bulk of the emissions reductions come from suppliers upgrading their production processes as opposed to reducing their sales to the EU. For every tonne of emissions avoided on EU sales there is a further 1.1 tonne of emissions avoided on sales to other markets. This is attributed to firm-wide technology upgrades, cleaning up output shipped both to the EU and to other countries.