Home » Too few formal jobs, or a preference for informal work? What Brazilian workers do when offered a formal contract Guest post by Carla Srebot

Too few formal jobs, or a preference for informal work? What Brazilian workers do when offered a formal contract Guest post by Carla Srebot

by NNW Bureau
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This is the 12th in this year’s series of posts by PhD students on the job market.

If workers could leave informality, would they? That choice may depend on what changes when their job becomes formal: take-home pay, working hours, access to labor and social-security protections, or the flexibility to balance work and family responsibilities. With 58% of workers worldwide holding an unregulated job, understanding these trade-offs matters for policies that aim to reduce informality. Yet observing workers in informal jobs tells us little about whether their situation reflects a market failure that limits access to formal employment or workers’ preferences for informal work. In my job market paper, I bring new evidence from Brazil to a simple question that is surprisingly hard to answer empirically: if an informal worker’s own employer put a formal contract on the table, would the worker sign it—and what would shape that decision?

Take Brazil as an example, where 38% of workers are informally employed. About a third of these workers are salaried employees without a signed contract, and roughly half are self-employed without tax registration. For employers, the cost of hiring formally is high, and until the 2017 labor reform, formal contracts offered little room for flexible working hours. My paper focuses on salaried workers without a signed contract. Many already work for formally registered firms, a pattern also observed in other countries in the region, such as Mexico and Peru. Growing evidence on informality has pointed to two driving explanations: workers are informal for “opportunity” reasons—the voluntary informality wherein workers prefer informal jobs—or for “necessity” reasons—the involuntary informality due to a lack of formal job offers. This distinction is usually drawn for the choice between self-employment and salaried work, but it applies similarly to a salaried worker deciding whether to work under a formal contract. For workers, a formal contract can mean less money to take home and less flexibility to change their hours. Workers have to pay 7.5–14% of their gross wages in social security contributions. If employers also offer lower wages to cover some of their own payroll costs, take-home pay can fall even further.

Which of the two explanations dominates has first-order policy consequences: the remedy for too few formal job offers is very different from the remedy for formal contracts that workers do not find worth accepting.

Separating preferences from access is empirically challenging: the formalization rate is an equilibrium object that reflects the decisions of workers and firms as well as the labor market’s ability to match a firm willing to offer a formal job with a worker in search of such an arrangement. What we need to observe is whether informal workers would accept a formal contract if their current employer offered one. I approximate this setting through two complementary approaches: labor inspections in Brazil that require employers to register informal workers, and a survey experiment that elicits acceptance under a guaranteed formal offer.

Do informal workers want to formalize?

When Brazilian labor inspectors detect workers without a formal contract, they require the employer to register them under the social security system—that is, to formalize them. I use novel inspection data that record labor-code violations, penalties imposed on firms, and the exact number of informal workers detected, separately by gender. Using a matched difference-in-differences design that compares inspected firms to observationally similar, never-inspected firms within the same labor market, I measure take-up of formal employment as the inspection-induced inflow of new formal hires divided by the number of informal workers subject to the formalization requirement.

Most informal workers formalize immediately: within six months of the inspection, new formal hires correspond to 78% of detected informal men and 68% of detected informal women (Figure 1). Declining does not mean staying informal at the inspected firm: the employer remains liable for fines and back payments. A worker who does not sign has to leave, potentially for another informal job.

One limitation of the inspection approach is that I observe formal registrations but not the offers made to individual workers. To complement these results, I surveyed 1,501 Brazilian workers and focus on the 942 who have held an informal job. Respondents consider a vignette that mimics a real labor inspection and answer whether they would accept their employer registering their existing job. When employee social-security contributions lower take-home pay, 57% of women accept, compared to 66% of men—a gender gap comparable to my estimates from actual inspections. The vignette also includes a scenario that I cannot observe in the administrative records, in which the employer raises gross pay to cover the contribution and take-home pay stays the same. Acceptance climbs to 77% among women and 81% among men, and the gender gap shrinks to a third of its size and is no longer statistically significant (Figure 1). Women are not more likely to reject formal employment per se; they are more sensitive to its immediate monetary cost. The two scenarios differ only in whether take-home pay falls, and that difference alone moves women’s acceptance by 21 percentage points, compared with 15 points for men.

read more: https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/impactevaluations/too-few-formal-jobs–or-a-preference-for-informal-work–what-bra

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